In this paper we describe a novel approach to model smart meter networks aimed at analyzing security related aspects of such networks. The model is realized as a multi-agent based simulation. This allows for detailed analysis of network behaviour on different layers. The layers realized in the simulation are a protocol layer for syntactic analysis of the protocol, a data layer for semantic analysis of the commands transmitted, and an information layer where metering data is interpreted. The ultimate goal of the project is the design and proof-of-concept implementation of an innovative Intrusion Detection System specifically apt for smart meter networks. The simulation described in this paper together with data from real world field tests will be used to deduce formal rules describing regular behaviour of the network which then will be the input for the IDS.
INTRODUCTION
Since the directive of 2006 of the European Parliament (EUR-Lex 2006) and the regulation of the introduction of intelligent electricity meters (Bundesgesetzblatt 2012) power grid operators are obliged to changeover into a new advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) if the technical and economical feasibility is ensured. This will not only fundamentally change the energy supply landscape but also constitute a major security challenge since all those households will be connected to the IT systems of domestic energy providers, resulting in a vast increase in the number of possible attack vectors for criminal or terrorist threats.
To meet these security challenges it is necessary to research the possibilities of attacks against smart meter networks and respective countermeasures. Finally our work should result in an integrated framework consisting of a dedicated Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and its organizational embedding. Conventional IDS do not meet the fundamentally different requirements in AMI (Khush et al. 2011 ).
Before designing the dedicated IDS formal rules describing either anomalies (blacklist approach) or regular behaviour of the system (whitelist approach) must be defined. As network traffic in smart meter networks is rather homogenous it seems easier to follow a whitelist approach. To deduce the rules describing regular network behaviour we will follow two paths: on one side we will observe network traffic in a real world test setting with 200 households; as this usually is not enough -as a real world test setting is always limited -we have designed a system model we can use for simulation to provide more data of possible regular system behaviour. This model must provide a systematic view of all parameters relevant to security issues and anomaly detection specifically for AMI.
EXISTING APPROACHES
Intrusion detection Systems are discussed in many papers and most of them refer to the adoption of such a system to the special needs coming along with an advanced metering infrastructure. Wu et al. (2011) propose the implementation of an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) ensuring the secure communication within a Smart Grid environment. Both the Home Area Network (HAN) and relevant parts of the Smart Grid should be protected in a proper way. The Home-IPS shall protect devices against unauthorised access. Basis for the decision whether an action is benign or malicious should be a conventional IDS-approach using either signature based and/or rule-based anomaly detection.
Mitchell and Chen (2013) describe a behaviourbased intrusion detection system protecting the control and data collection systems in smart grids. The focus is on detecting anomalies in the behaviour of the devices. Depending on the target, activities are defined to identify changes in the supply or the billing period reacting to system warnings to show deviant behaviour. These Rules result in behavioural indicators which are represented by rules defined by propositional calculus. Zhang et al. (2011) consider all aspects of smart grids (HAN, NAN and WAN) and present a distributed analysis module to detect malicious behaviour intelligently. The detection pattern can be statistically determined from observations using SVM-based Machine Learning and Artificial Immune System Approach. The represented attacks (divided into denial of service, privilege escalation, probing/scanning) should be detected successfully after a training phase. A distributed network-based approach is described in which only deviant behaviour is defined. Baig and Ahmad (2013) focus on the threat of infiltrated devices into the smart grid. Due to the high interconnection of various components a manipulated device would be capable of adversely affecting other participants and passing incorrect data to the data collector. Manipulated meters should be detected by deviant communication intervals (e.g. more transmissions within a time slot).
Jokar (2012) describes an anomaly and specification based intrusion detection system. Multiple properties are defined representing normal behaviour. These properties are defined in the form of specifications and statistical values and everything differing is considered to be malicious. In order to keep the false positive rate low additional correlations of properties (e.g. signal strength, communication patterns, power consumption) and a Bayesian classifier is used. This approach was implemented in a HAN at two components: the central IDS and the agents. The mentioned properties are defined at the two lowest network layers (physical layer and MAC layer). It is one of the few works attempting to define the normal behaviour of systems.
Another work using a whitelist approach is described in Genge et al. (2014) . In this paper a network can be modeled and Snort anomaly detection rules are generated automatically. However, this approach is limited to detection rules for TCP and UDT protocols. In AMI, however, often other protocols (such as protocols based on the Open Smart Grid Protocol) are applied due to the use of non-standard transmission channels like communication over power line.
SYSTEM MODELL
Multi-agent based simulation was chosen as an abstract system model of an advanced metering infrastructure simulation. A main benefit of this approach is that it can provide a broad spectrum of system behaviours, which is important as simple observation of real-life network traffic may not show enough regular behaviour. Another benefit of the simulation was the generation of test data. The differences within the smart meter manufacturer and used technologies represented a challenge in order to develop an independent generally valid model.
Basis of the simulation is the Mason multiagent simulation toolkit. The MASON simulation toolkit is designed to support large numbers of agents relatively efficiently on a single machine (Luke 2014). The functions of smart meters in the simulation are derived from the operations defined in the Open Smart Grid Protocol (OSGP). The OSGP is a companion specification defining a representation model of a smart grid containing data concentrators, communication proxies and Smart grid devices.
A smart meter in this context primary consists of three modules:
Data Collection: Basis of the data collection is the load profile. According to the specification (Wu et al. 2011) The first step of the simulation consists of parsing the configuration file containing all necessary information about all devices and their parameters. Then concentrators are initialized and the simulation time is synchronized. In the next step smart meter devices are initialized and the meter initializes the consumption simulator and the data collection module, parses the time-of-use calendar and creates a schedule for tier switches. Smart meters are now present in the network of the correspondent concentrator and are ready to be connected. The consumption data is stored in different registers. The first value is a total value similar to the counter of a metering device ascending correspondingly to simulated consumption. Another value is a daily, total consumption value. Power consumption is also stored depending on the time of consumption in maximum four tariffs. In a preconfigured interval the smart meter devices generate a load profile out of the stored consumption values and commit it to the registered data concentrator. The smart meter also performs data validation and creates an error message if the check fails.
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
The information required to detect an intrusion comprises system, network and policy information. This data has to be retrieved from different locations in the infrastructure (Grochocki et al. 2012 ).
The essential characteristics of the desired solution are:
• The monitoring system is primarily based on a white-list approach.
• The monitoring system is hierarchical.
• In addition to purely technical levels organisational levels are involved, too, when defining decision-making hierarchies.
• The individual hierarchy levels are characterized by different information available at each level.
• The definition of regular conditions is done by means of a formal system to provide a flexible basis for the implementation of monitoring algorithms.
The hereby proposed approach to define rules describing regular system behaviour needed to detect anomalies (everything not compliant with the rules) consists of three layers (see figure 1) .
Figure 1 Multi-Layer IDS
The first and fundamental layer is the protocol used for the transport of information over the network as well as the management of the network itself. LonTalk was chosen as an OSGP compliant protocol. One of the unique features of an AMI is, that the smart meter communicates with the data concentrator (DC) over power line. The goal is analysing the LonTalk protocol on a behavioural basis within the context of an advanced metering infrastructure. In regular situations only a subset of the protocol is used. On this level compliance of the network traffic with this subset can be checked. The rules to be applied on this layer define the subset of the protocol used by the network. Any deviation from this subset is an abnormal situation indicating a security relevant intrusion. This not only detects a specific set of attacks but also lowers interface complexity facilitating test coverage.
On the second layer the behaviour of all connected devices with respect to the exchange of commands can be analysed. The main focus is on connection paths and their initialisation as well as predefined functions. The analysis is based on a database containing all log and event entries of all devices (of different manufactures) participating in an advanced metering infrastructure. Commands and their execution times can be correlated with specific properties. These properties contain static device or manufacturer specific characteristics as well as dynamic features like network load or topology.
On the third layer information validation is conducted. This means that the transmitted metrological data is interpreted and series of such data can be seen as constituting a load profile.
Such observed load profiles can be compared to expected load profiles stemming from statistical forecasting methods. Such comparisons will yield plausibility ratings of the observed data. Different forecasting methods are considered and will be analysed with respect to their suitability in the given context.
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
The widespread introduction of smart meters as part of smart grid infrastructures poses new and hitherto unknown challenges to network security; it will not only give rise to new attack vectors but will also lead to a huge increase of possible attack points. Research as a basis for the development of effective countermeasures is therefore urgently needed. This paper describes a multi-agent based simulation of smart meter networks developed to simulate scenarios of systems in regular operation and under attack. The simulations of systems in regular operation are used to deduce whitelist descriptions of network behaviour. As the simulation allows for different layers to be specified and observed these descriptions can be defined in a layered structure. Different aspects of network behaviour are found on different layers: on the protocol layer restrictions of the protocol applicable to the specialized requirements of smart meter networks can be checked, on the data layer the structure of commands transmitted over the network can be analysed for suspicious activities, and on the information layer the metrological data can be analysed and by comparison with standard consumption profiles anomalies can be detected.
The next steps will be to summarize the rules deduced and integrate them in an intrusion detection system tailored to the properties of advanced metering infrastructures. In addition to this technical model an organisational model, acting as an interface between the technical system and the staff working with this system, will be defined. This monitoring strategy contains policies embedded in the operationally context in consideration of international standards (e.g. ISO 27001).
